A fter disasters such as the attacks of September 11, 2001, the public experiences a heightened response that naturally returns to some lower level of concern. We demonstrate that this pattern of heightened response followed by a decline as time passes also occurs for terrorist events that are near misses. Data from a field study and two experimental lab studies show that people's perceptions of the risk of similar category events and their perception that the near-miss attempt was close to being a successful terrorist attack decline over time. Moreover, the decline in the perception of how close the near miss was to being a successful terrorist attack partially explains the decline in the perception of the risk of future similar category events. We also show that the perceived risk for terrorism in general decays more slowly than for a specific category event, and is reactivated by additional terrorist attempts. Finally, we show that people rely on reference points to provide the context for near-miss terrorism events, and without reference points assessing perceptions of risk and perceptions of how close an event was to having a truly bad outcome are difficult. The reliance on reference points for context can result in different people evaluating the same event differently depending on that person's information about prior terrorist attempts. Our contributions provide guidance to organizations such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for encouraging stakeholders to make rational decisions on the basis of the nature, scale, and scope of the attack that balance recovery with continued vigilance. We also provide information to other intelligence agencies who need to consider their own individuals' personal biases that may arise when repeatedly examining terrorist near misses.
Introduction
Researchers have demonstrated that after significant disasters such as those of September 11, 2001 , the public experiences an initial heightened response to the event that over time naturally returns to some lower level of concern (Burns 2007) . For example, in surveys six months after September 11, 54% of respondents claimed they changed their daily actions as a result of the terrorist attacks but by two years after the attack only 33% claimed they changed their daily actions (McArdle et al. 2012) . In London, surveys of commuters immediately following the July 7, 2005 bombings, reported 32% intended to travel less often by mass transportation, but only 19% of commuters surveyed seven months after the attack said they intended to travel less often (Gigerenzer 2006 , Gordon 2007 ). Other studies demonstrate that the use of the London mass transportation system returned to expected levels three months after the bombings (Sheppard et al. 2006) , and after the 2004 Madrid attacks, the decline in train travel lasted about two months (Prager et al. 2011) . In the natural disaster context, Michel-Kerjan et al. (2012) detail how many flood insurance policy holders initially purchase flood insurance following a significant flooding event (i.e., in 2006, following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, the number of new policies grew 3-4 times the growth rate seen in previous years) and then let the policy lapse within a few years (i.e., the median time of flood insurance policy tenure for 27 Downloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124 .17] on 03 August 2015, at 13:46 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. Dillon, Tinsley, and Burns Disasters by definition create large negative consequences that can instigate acute distress and anxiety. These feelings of vulnerability encourage people to take protective action in response to the event, oftentimes trying to avoid situations where the hazard may occur. But people are also resilient, and over time their coping mechanisms encourage a return to predisaster levels of concern about the hazard (Bonanno et al. 2010 ). These two responses define an iterative space between feelings of vulnerability and feelings of resilience that generally result in an initial increase in the perception of risk toward a category of events after a significant disaster (e.g., earthquakes, flooding, terrorist attacks, etc.) followed by a decline over time to predisaster levels of concern.
Although this pattern of concern appears to be well documented for all types of hazards (e.g., natural events, technological failures, terrorist attacks), prior research has focused on responses to significant disasters and, in particular, has focused on responses to one single event. More often than experiencing significant disasters, most people experience near misses. Near misses are events that have some nontrivial expectation of ending in disaster but, by chance, do not. Whereas disasters by definition have significant damage, commonly death, injury, and property damage, near misses do not have this same physical impact. Because these near misses are more prevalent and generally have no obviously bad outcome (at least to the observer), it is important to examine how people respond to near-miss events and how they respond to multiple events across time. We build on prior work to examine how this phenomenon of decreasing risk perception over time works when the event is not an actual disaster but is a near miss and we study responses to multiple near misses over time.
One interesting distinction between a near miss and a disaster is that a near miss is commonly a far more ambiguous event than a disaster. On the one hand, people can interpret a near miss in a way that emphasizes that a disaster did not happen, i.e., people are safe and the "protection" system worked. On the other hand, near misses may be perceived as a signal or a reminder that a worse disaster could have happened, i.e., people may not feel safe because the "protection" system came close to failure. Different characteristics of the near-miss event will thus highlight as more salient either feelings of vulnerability or feelings of resilience. As Kahneman (2003, p. 703) explains, "perception is reference dependent: The perceived attributes of a focal stimulus reflect the contrast between that stimulus and a context of prior and concurrent stimuli." We consider this observation in terms of terrorism near misses (fortunately in the United States, most terrorist attacks have been near misses). If someone compares a near-miss attempt to September 11, the near miss may not seem at all close to having been a successful terrorist attack. But if that person compares the same near-miss attempt to what has come to represent an average day where no attack was attempted, the same near-miss attempt may seem closer to an attack. Because of this ambiguity regarding how close the event was to being a disaster, we consider the importance of reference points for the interpretation of near misses.
This research is important because after an attempted terrorist attack in the United States, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) wants stakeholders to make rational decisions on the basis of the nature, scale, and scope of the attack that balance recovery with continued vigilance. Some level of memory decay is important to a successful recovery, but too much forgetfulness will hinder the vigilance required to prevent the next attack. If DHS can convince stakeholders to behave rationally through appropriate risk communication messages and balance recovery with vigilance, DHS can minimize the economic impact of an attempted terrorist attack. If stakeholders make irrational decisions (either reckless in terms of prevention or overly cautious in terms of avoidance), these decisions will only increase the economic impact of the attempted attack helping the terrorists achieve their goals. Of course, this same situation is true outside the United States with other agencies responsible for the DHS role in communicating to stakeholders regarding attempted terrorist events. This research is also important to other agencies in the intelligence community who need to consider their own individuals' personal biases that may arise when repeatedly examining terrorist near misses over time.
Perceived Risk and Resilience
Literature that explains this heightened perception of risk following a disaster include probability neglect Downloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124 (Sunstein 2003) , the social amplification of risk (Kasperson et al. 1988) , and dread risk (Slovic 1987) . Sunstein (2003) shows that when strong emotions are involved, people disregard probabilities and will pay a significant amount to avoid a low probability hazard. Kasperson et al. (1988) demonstrate how disastrous events amplify the transfer of information about the risk and thus increase society's response and feeling of vulnerability initially. Slovic (1987) describes how feelings of dread and uncertainty, salient after a catastrophe, increase one's perceptions of risk. All of these factors contribute to a heightened awareness of the risk following a disaster and should apply to those near-miss events that are recognized as being close to having been disasters. An individual's coping mechanism balance these heightened perceptions of risk over time. Kahneman and Riis (2005) discuss the difference between one's remembering self and one's experiencing self. An individual's overall well-being will balance his happiness with his remembered experiences (i.e., memories) and his current experiences. Over time, in the case of recovering from a disaster, more remembered experiences after the disaster will help the recovery process. Other psychologists have studied recovery from traumatic events and have determined that there is no single dominant predictor for whether a survivor will be resilient, struggle with a more gradual recovery, or develop an enduring psychopathology (Bonanno et al. 2010) . These studies show that recovery and resilience is a complex interaction of many small factors that all contribute to the overall process. In predicting recovery, the literature divides factors into three categories: predisaster context, preparation and prior exposure, and proximal exposure to the disaster. The predisaster context examines individual characteristics such as age, gender, and socioeconomic status where research shows that children, females, and the poor tend to be the least resilient (Bonanno et al. 2010) . Additionally, those with strong social support and higher selfefficacy personality types tend to be more resilient. Bonnano et al. (2010) describe how prior experiences with disasters can actually inoculate people against psychological effects in subsequent disasters. They concluded that the more earthquake experiences a person had endured prior to the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the less likely they were to have extreme psychological reactions. Finally, regarding proximal exposure, responses to events tend to be described by a dose-response effect, i.e., greater exposure is generally associated with poorer psychological adjustment (Bonanno et al. 2010 ). Thus, a little exposure to a particular type of disaster can demonstrate to people their capacity for recovery, but too much exposure can be too difficult to recover from and thus lead to psychological damage.
Despite these competing forces, most people do recover from disasters. Burns and Slovic (2010) demonstrate this with a system dynamics model that shows that although risk perceptions increase from factors such as media coverage, community intervention also increases offering support, reducing the perception of risk, and promoting recovery. As time passes and memories of the event become less vivid, normal cognitive operation returns and individuals revert to previous attitudes and beliefs. Vertzberger (1997) describes this as the "bounce-back hypothesis." He developed this hypothesis by studying national identity variables for Israeli citizens in the months immediately following Yitzhak Rabin's assassination. He found that beliefs reverted to pre-event levels within six months. Another study of young Israeli's reaction to national trauma (Raviv et al. 2000) showed that respondents reverted to normal patterns of behavior within three to six months.
Near Misses
All of the previous studies examined looked at a single disaster event and explored how people reverted to predisaster attitudes over time. This research is different in two important ways. First, rather than looking at disasters, we explore near misses where some near misses are perceived more closely to being disasters and others are not Tinsley 2008, Tinsley et al. 2012) . Second, we look at the effect of multiple events occurring during the study period.
In interpreting events with ambiguous information, people look for comparison reference points and similar types of events to attempt to interpret the new uncertain event (Kahneman 2003, Kahneman and Miller 1986 Which events get categorized together will depend on the set of terrorist attempts salient in people's mind at the time they are processing and judging the attempt. For example, "attempting to detonate a bomb on a United Airlines flight" would be more similarly classified in people's minds as "attempting to detonate a bomb on an American Airlines flight" than "attempting to detonate a bomb on an Amtrak train." Whereas, "attempting to detonate a bomb on a United Airlines flight" might be classified more similarly to "attempting to detonate a bomb on an Amtrak train" than "attempting to detonate a bomb in a public square." All of these attempts can be classified in the more general "terrorism" category.
Based on the resilience/recovery literature discussed, we have two sets of hypotheses regarding near-miss terrorist attempts. The first is a set of decay hypotheses and the second set specifically addresses reference points.
As demonstrated in studies of disasters, it is expected that the perceived risk of a terrorist attack that results in a near miss will decay as time passes following the event.
Hypothesis 1. The perceived risk of a particular terrorist attempt that resulted in a near miss will decay over time if there are no other similar category events that occur during the time period studied.
We propose that this decay in perceived levels of risk for particular attacks should be explained by fading memories and thus evaluations of how close the actual event came to being a successful attack (meaning that the terrorist succeeded in his goal of bombing a target). This change in evaluation would also be consistent with the hindsight bias (Fischhoff 2003) where as more time occurs without incident, individuals begin to recall the event more in line with current experience. Therefore, judgments about how close the near-miss event came to being a successful terrorist attack should show a similar decline to the perceived risk over time. Moreover, this decline in judgment of how close the past attempt came to being a successful attack should at least partially mediate the decline in perceived risk over time. We anticipate partial mediation (rather than full mediation) because of the myriad of other factors at any period of time that will influence the perception of risk and the recovery following a terrorist attempt (such as media coverage, level of social support, previous disaster experience, etc.).
Hypothesis 2. One's perception of how close the near miss came to being a successful terrorist event will decline as there is more distance in time from the near-miss attempt.
Hypothesis 3. One's perception of the risk of a terrorist attack will be partially mediated by judgments of how close the near miss came to being a successful terrorist attack.
Although people's perception of the risk of similar category events will decay over time if there are no other analogous events during the study time period, the perceived risk for terrorism in general should decay less rapidly (and may oscillate) if it is continually reprimed by different category terrorist attempts.
Hypothesis 4. The perceived risk of general terrorism will not decay over time as long as terrorism attempts continue to occur.
We also propose a second set of hypotheses specifically addressing reference points. Any event can be interpreted as more or less dangerous depending on the nature of prior events that are recalled. Since same category attempts (attempts to crash an airplane or attempts to explode a bomb at a public gathering) will be the easiest reference points, we believe we will see strong effects for the perceived risk and closeness of an attempt, depending on how it is contrasted to prior same category events. We also believe that this pattern will be more prominent if people are evaluating multiple events at once rather than one at a time.
Hypothesis 5. The same event can produce strikingly different reactions from different individuals as a function of the availability of comparison events for each individual.
Hypothesis 6. People evaluating several near-miss attempts all at once will make starker contrasts between near-miss events that vary on perceived closeness of the attempt than people evaluating the same near-miss events, in the same order, but doing so one at a time.
We test these hypotheses in a series of studies described next. Downloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124 .17] on 03 August 2015, at 13:46 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
Overview of Studies
We test our hypotheses regarding the relationships between the interpretation of near-miss events and risk perception in three studies. The first study used a nationwide panel of participants arranged by Decision Research, a non-profit research organization located in Eugene, Oregon. Panel participants were asked a series of questions at six points in time between December 2009 and December 2010 about actual events including three terrorist attempts in the United States (i.e., Northwest Airlines Flight 253, the May 2010 attack in Times Square, New York, and the November 2010 attack in Portland, Oregon). Each of these three events is a near miss, but because they differ on many characteristics, they are likely to vary in the degree to which people perceive the event as close to having been a successful terrorist attack (i.e., in the Portland event, the bomber did not have a real bomb). The second and third studies used students in an undergraduate subject pool who answered questions about their perceptions of sequences of terrorism event scenarios over several time periods where the description of the events were constructed to vary how close the event was to being a successful terrorist attack.
Study 1: Risk Perceptions of 2009-2010 U.S. Terrorism Near Misses
The first study used a nationwide panel of participants (n(total) = 852; 609 (Time 1), 754 (Time 2), 737 (Time 3), 691 (Time 4), 637 (Time 5), 656 (Time 6)) arranged by Decision Research. Panel participants were asked a series of questions at six points in time about their perceptions of multiple events (including terrorism attacks, natural disasters, and the financial crisis). We focus here on data collected regarding perceptions of the risk and the degree of success for three terrorist attacks, the "underwear bomber," the Times Square attack, and the attack against the Portland tree lighting ceremony. In the first event, Northwest Flight 253 was attacked on December 25, 2009 by 23-year-old Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab with an improvised explosive device sewn into his underwear. The bomb initially failed to detonate, and nearby passengers were able to subdue Abdulmutallab. In the second event, U.S. citizen Faisal Shahzad, attempted to explode a car bomb in Times Square, New York on May 1, 2010. The bomb had been ignited, but failed to explode, and was disarmed by police after two street vendors reported smoke coming from the vehicle. In the third event, Mohamed Osman Mohamud, 19, was arrested as he tried to detonate a van that he believed was loaded with explosives at the crowded Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon, November 26, 2010. The bomb, though, was an elaborate fake supplied by the FBI, and the public was never actually in any danger from this attempt.
In December 2009 (immediately following the Flight 253 bombing attempt) and then at five later time periods (Jan. 2010 , Feb. 2010 , May 2010 , Sept. 2010 , and Dec. 2010 , panel respondents were asked the following, specifically regarding the Flight 253 event:
• How fearful would you feel about traveling on an airplane right now?
• How much do you agree with the statement: Since the attempt on Flight 253, I think flying has become more risky.
• How much do you agree with the statement: Flight 253 was almost blown up.
• How much do you agree with the statement: It was just luck that the bomb did not go off.
The first two statements were used as a scale for measuring the perception that flying has become more risky following the terrorist attack. The Cronbach's alpha over the six time periods for this scale were in the range of 0.73-0.79. The third and fourth statements were used as a scale for measuring the degree respondents saw this near-miss event as close to being a successful terrorist attack (i.e., successful from the terrorist's perspective). The Cronbach's alpha over the six time periods for this scale were in the range of 0.64-0.72.
Respondents were asked in time periods 4-6 of the panel survey about the Times Square bombing (immediately following this event in May 2010 and then in September 2010 and again in December 2010). Panel respondents were asked the following specifically regarding the attempted bombing of Times Square with an improvised explosive device in a car:
• • How much do you agree with the statement: Since this attempt, I think being in popular tourist attractions or locations with lots of people has become more risky.
• How much do you agree with the statement: Times Square was almost hit by terrorists.
The first two statements were used as a scale for measuring the perception that visiting major cities with tourist locations has become more risky since the Times Square attack. The Cronbach's alpha over the three time periods for this scale were in the range of 0.70-0.71. The third and fourth statements were used as a scale for measuring the degree respondents saw this near-miss event as close to being a successful terrorist attack (i.e., successful from the terrorist's perspective). The Cronbach's alpha over the three time periods for this scale were in the range of 0.68-0.71.
Regarding the Portland tree lighting ceremony attack, participants were asked the following:
• The Portland tree lighting ceremony was almost hit by a terrorist.
• It was just luck that the attack at the Portland tree lighting ceremony did not succeed.
• Since the Portland incident, I believe that visiting tourist attractions has become more risky.
Because the Portland tree lighting ceremony attack occurred immediately prior to our last and final data collection, we are concerned in this research only with the perception of risk of the event as a reminder of the risk of general terrorism and do not have the decay over time of the perception of risk for the Portland incident. For additional analysis of the perceptions of near miss of the Portland incident, see Dillon et al. (2013) .
Additionally, respondents were asked in all six time periods how much they agreed with the following thoughts regarding terrorism in general:
• The threat of terrorism in the United States is greatly exaggerated by media.
• The threat of terrorism in the United States is greatly exaggerated by the Department of Homeland Security.
• I feel the terrorist threats the country is facing pose a greater threat to my future quality of life than does the threat of large natural disasters.
• I feel the terrorist threats the country is facing pose a greater threat to my future quality of life than does the threat of the financial crisis.
• I feel the terrorist threats the country is facing pose a greater threat to my future quality of life than does the threat of global warming.
• Joblessness is a far greater threat to the nation than terrorist attacks on airplanes or in public places.
• A lack of adequate health insurance is a far greater threat to our nation than are terrorist attacks on airplanes or in public places.
These items were used as a scale for measuring the respondent's perception of risk of terrorism in general with items 1, 2, 6, and 7 reverse-coded. The Cronbach's alpha over the six time periods for this scale were in the range of 0.78-0.83.
Results and Analysis. The perception of the risk of flying following the Flight 253 attack across the study period is shown in Figure 1 . Using a mixed level linear model (fixed-effects-only, participants as level 2 and perceptions of events and risks as level 1), time (measured in months after the attack) significantly predicted the perception of the risk of flying, F 1 3226 8 = 169 3, p < 0 001. Allowing intercepts or slopes to vary did not improve the fit of the model. This analysis is Model 1 in Table 1 , and the negative sign on the regression coefficient supports Hypothesis 1.
The perception of how close the Flight 253 attack was to being a successful terrorist attack is shown in Figure 2 . Using a mixed-level linear model (fixedeffects-only, participants as level 2 and perceptions of events and risks as level 1), time (measured in months after the attack) significantly predicted the evaluation of how close the bombing of Flight 253 was to being a successful terrorist event, F 1 4049 = 22 6, p < 0 001. Perception that the Flight 253 b = 0 491 attack was close to being a t 4 000 = 28 57 successful terrorist attack p < 0 001
Chi-square likelihood ratio test 2 change = 816 3, df change = 1, p < 0 01
Allowing intercepts or slopes to vary did not improve the fit of the model. This analysis shows that time measured in months following the attack is a significant predictor of the evaluation of the event as a near miss, b = −0 013, t 4 049 = −4 76, p < 0 001. The negative sign on the regression coefficient supports Hypothesis 2 that the perception of the near miss as close to being a successful attack declines as time passes following the event.
To examine Hypothesis 3, we added the evaluation of Flight 253 in terms of how close it was to being a successful terrorist attack as Model 2, Table 1 . Model 2 improves the fit of the multilevel model tested (using the chi-square likelihood ratio as a test of fit). Time is still a predictor but the evaluation of the near miss is also a significant predictor and the coefficient for time is reduced demonstrating partial mediation, supporting Hypothesis 3.
To examine Hypothesis 4, mixed-level modeling (fixed-effects-only, participants as level 2 and perceptions of events and risks as level 1) was used to examine the perception of general terrorism. The first model included only time (measured in months after Table 2 . The perception of general terrorism risk over time is shown in Figure 3 . In Model 1, time does predict the perception of general terrorism and allowing intercepts or slopes to vary did not improve the fit of the model. Note though that the regression coefficient is very small (−0 007) showing little decay of the perception of the general risk of terrorism. Model 2 includes the perception of the risk of flying following the Flight 253 attack over the six survey time periods as a predictor. This model improves the fit of the multilevel model tested (using the chi-square likelihood ratio as a test of fit). With the perception of the risk of flying following the Flight 253 attack included in the model, time is no longer significant, demonstrating that the perception of risk of flying fully mediates any influence of time. To capture the impact of follow-on terrorist attacks on the perception of general terrorism, in Model 3, we included the perception that tourism is more risky as measured in the survey conducted immediately following the Times Square attack (time 4) and the perception that tourism is more risky because of the Portland attack (time 6). This model further improves the fit, and both the perception that flying is more risky over time and the perception that tourism is more risky are both significant predictors of the perception of general terrorism and time is not, supporting Hypothesis 4 where including the perceptions of risk of the other terrorist events (Times Square and Portland) reduces the influence of the perception of the risk of flying, demonstrating partial mediation of that variable.
Discussion. As proposed, our analysis showed that both the perceived risk for a specific terrorist attack (in this case, the attempted bombing of Flight 253) Downloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124 and the perception of how close the event came to being a disaster decline as time passes from the original event. Further, mixed-level modeling showed that the perception of how close the event was to being a disaster partially mediated the influence of time on the decline of the perceived risk. We also showed that the perceived risk for terrorism in general (i.e., not for a specific attack) decays more slowly, and is reactivated by additional terrorist attempts, here the Times Square attack and the Portland tree lighting ceremony plot. Because these latter two attempts are not of the same category as an attempt on an airplane, they do not raise the perceived risk of an airplane attack. Yet, they do continue to reactivate people's general terrorism category, so that perceived risk here remains high.
Study 2: Lab Study of Decay in Risk Perceptions
Study 1 showed that time is one palliative to fears about the risk of terrorism. A reason for this may be that people get distracted by other stimuli in their lives. One commonly cited coping mechanism for recovery from disasters is self-distraction through activity (Baldwin et al. 2011) . In Study 2, we explore if we can simulate the decay in risk perception that happens following an event by distracting participants with other tasks. We also took the opportunity for experimental control provided by the lab to create three same category terrorist scenarios that varied on how close the attack was perceived as being a successful attack (from the terrorist's perspective). Scenario 1 (shown next) is the furthest from being a successful attack and we will refer to this scenario as a weak near miss. Scenario 2 is closest to being a successful attack and we will refer to this scenario as a strong near miss; scenario 3 is in between and thus a medium near miss. Half of the participants were shown the weak scenario to rate, then given a distraction task, and then shown the medium scenario. The remaining participants were shown the strong scenario, then given a distraction task, and then were shown the medium scenario. During the second simulated time period where participants were given the distraction tasks they were told no further attacks occurred in that simulated time period.
Scenario 1, the weak near-miss scenario, described the following event. The bold typeface was not bolded for participants but is shown here to describe why this attempt is the furthest of the three from having been a successful attack from the terrorist's perspective. U.S. officials have arrested an Al Qaeda operative outside of Los Angeles International Airport LAX with a man-portable air-defense system MANPADS in his possession. MANPADS are shoulder-mounted devices that serve as a short-range surface-to-air missile. They are easy to carry, weighing about as much as a full golf bag, and easy to transport, being sized to fit into the trunk of a car. There are thousands of MANPADS devices unaccounted for worldwide, raising concern about the ease of their acquisition.
Officials believe that the terrorist was minutes away from firing the missile at American Airlines Flight 101 from a truck in a long term parking structure within the vicinity of the airport.
Department of Homeland Security officials are working closely with major airport security teams to expand airport perimeter surveillance. Plans include creating secure checkpoints, increasing foot patrols within a mile of the airport, and installing hundreds of security cameras.
Scenario 2, the strong near-miss scenario, described the following event. Again, the bold typeface is to emphasize the differences in scenarios here and did not appear bold to the participants.
An Al Qaeda operative shot a shoulder-fired missile at American Airlines Flight 101 just minutes after its ascent from Los Angeles International Airport LAX . The missile impacted the leading edge of the right wing. With 146 people on board, the aircraft made an emergency landing into Long Beach Airport-37 people were injured in the attack.
U.S. officials arrested the believed terrorist outside of LAX. Authorities confirmed that a man-portable air-defense system MANPADS in his possession was used to launch the missile from a truck in a long-term parking structure within the vicinity of the airport. MANPADS are shoulder-mounted devices that serve as a short-range surface-to-air missile. They are easy to carry, weighing about as much as a full golf bag, and easy to transport, being sized to fit into the trunk of a car. There are thousands of MANPADS devices unaccounted for worldwide, raising concern about the ease of their acquisition.
Scenario 3, the medium near-miss scenario, described the following event.
On the anniversary of the American Airlines Flight 101 attack, an Al Qaeda operative shot a shoulderfired missile at United Airlines Flight 81 just minutes after its ascent from Washington DC's Reagan National Airport (DCA). The missile missed hitting the aircraft by more than 100 yards, but, with 139 people on board, the aircraft made an emergency landing at Dulles International Airport. There was no damage to the aircraft and no injuries.
U.S. officials arrested the believed terrorist outside the airport. Authorities confirmed that a man-portable air-defense system MANPADS in his possession was used to launch the missile from a truck in the vicinity of the airport.
Department of Homeland Security officials stated that they will again review security at all major airports.
In addition to being told that no further attacks had occurred, participants were given several distraction tasks in the simulated time 2. We used a standard cognitive load manipulation that required participants to memorize an 8-digit number (Gilbert and Hixon 1991, Tormala and Petty 2004) . While memorizing the number, they were asked to read additional fictitious news headlines about Congress and chocolate milk, Peyton Manning the former Indianapolis Colts quarterback, and Arnold Schwarzenegger's latest film, and needed to answer true or false questions.
Data were collected from 257 undergraduate students from a large, private university in the eastern United States who completed a number of exercises, including this one, in return for class participation credit. Participants were asked similar questions to Study 1 for times 1, 2, and 3 including:
• To what extent was the airplane almost blown up?
• To what extent was it just luck that the airplane was not blown up?
• To what extent has flying become more risky?
• How fearful would you be about traveling on an airplane right now?
Using the same measures developed for Study 1, we used the first two questions in a scale to measure the perception of how close the attack was to being a success (i.e., how much of a near miss was the event) and the last two questions in a scale to measure the perception of risk of flying following a terrorist attack. No actual time delay occurred between the three simulated time periods, but participants were told that the second time period was 11 months after the first attack and that the third time period was one year after the first attack.
Results and Analysis. The perception of the risk of flying following the two different simulated attacks is shown in Figure 4 . The analysis initially focuses on only the first and second time periods for testing Hypotheses 1-3. We analyzed the two different attack conditions separately as shown in Table 3 attack scenario, F 1 258 = 18 35, p < 0 001. Allowing intercepts or slopes to vary did not improve the fits of either model. This analysis is Model 1.1 (for the weak near-miss scenario) and Model 2.1 (for the strong near-miss scenario) in Table 1 , and the negative sign on the regression coefficient supports Hypothesis 1. The perception of how close the simulated attack was to being a successful terrorist attack is shown in Figure 5 . Using a mixed-level linear model (fixedeffects-only, participants as level 2 and perceptions of events and risks as level 1), time (measured as experimental time period, coded 0 for the first time period and 1 for the second time) significantly predicted the evaluation of how close the attack was to being a successful terrorist event for the weak near-miss scenario, b = −0 52, t 256 = −2 25, p = 0 03. The negative sign on the regression coefficient supports Hypothesis 2 that the perception of the near-miss as close to being a successful attack declines as time passes following Table 3 Study 2 the event for this condition. Allowing intercepts or slopes to vary did not improve the fit of the model. For the strong near-miss condition, experimental time period did not reach a significant level, b = −0 30, t 258 = −1 09, p = 0 27. It is reasonable that since the strong condition had more salient details of damage and injuries, more time or distraction might be needed for the perception of this event to decline measurably. Thus, Study 2 showed that our experimental lab data provided mixed support for Hypothesis 2. It was supported for the weaker attempt but not for the stronger or closer-to-being-successful attempt.
To examine Hypothesis 3, we added the evaluation of the scenario in terms of how close it was to being a successful terrorist attack as Model 1.2 and Model 2.2, Table 1 . For both conditions, the second model improves the fit of the multilevel model tested (using the chi-square likelihood ratio as a test of fit). Time is still a predictor but the evaluation of the near Downloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124 .17] on 03 August 2015, at 13:46 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
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Further examining the results from Study 2, we find that when we compare the perception that flying is risky after reading the weak near-miss scenario to the strong scenario, the two scenarios are not seen as different between participants. We find the same pattern of results for the perception of how close the event is to being a successful terrorist attack. Using a repeated measures ANOVA with perception in time 1 and time 2 as the within-subjects variable and condition as the between-subjects variable, there is a main effect for perception of the event over time, F 1 255 = 25 76, p < 0 001. There is no main effect for condition F 1 255 < 1 0, and no significant interaction, F 1 255 = 1 85, p = 0 18. When participants read only one of the two conditions, without some reference point, the perceptions of risk of flying following events with very different outcomes and how close these events were to successful terrorist attacks are not perceived as different. Now examining the assessments at time 3, where all participants read the same medium near-miss scenario, using a repeated measures ANOVA with perception in times 1, 2, and 3 as the within-subjects variable and condition as the between-subjects variable, there is a main effect for perception over time, F 2 254 = 49 9, p < 0 001; a main effect for condition F 1 255 = 19 9, p < 0 001, and a significant interaction, F 2 254 = 86 6, p < 0 001. In contrast to the time 1 assessments, now judgments of how close an event is to being a terrorist attack depends on past events that provide reference points for the evaluation, and the same event can be evaluated very differently. The same medium nearmiss event is evaluated significantly differently if the prior reference point was a weak near miss versus a strong near miss (M medium-weak = 8 13, s.d. = 2 1; M medium-strong = 4 86, s.d. = 2 7, t 255 = 10 86, p < 0 001), supporting Hypothesis 5.
Discussion. The experimental lab data in Study 2 corroborated the results from Study 1. Study 2 successfully demonstrated a decline in the perception of risk of specific category terrorism events (in this case whether flying is more risky) supporting Hypothesis 1 and a decline in how much a weak near miss is perceived as close to being a successful event (but not for a strong near miss) providing mixed support for Hypothesis 2. We found that a between-subjects design did not show a difference in the initial assessment of the event between the weak near-miss scenario and the strong near-miss scenario. We argue that without reference points to provide the context for the event, it is difficult to assess perceptions of risk and perceptions of how close an event was to having a bad outcome. Decades of risk research have been searching for a risk metric equivalent in objectivity to height or weight to assess risk but without that elusive metric, risk will remain a relative assessment and reference points are critical when making a relative assessment (Caponecchia 2012) . We explore this reference point for near-miss terrorist attempts further in Study 3.
Another interesting observation from Study 2 is the pattern of the perception of risk of flying for those who saw the strong near miss in time 1 and the medium near miss in time 2. Between time 1 and time 2, the perception of the risk of flying decreases significantly. But in time 3 when the second attack occurs, the perception of the risk of flying returns to the time 1 level even when the second event is not as close to a successful terrorist attack as the first. Much of the current literature on effective risk communication (e.g., Sellnow et al. 2009 ) highlight the importance of inoculation messages and two-sided persuasion as options for risk communicators for both reducing uncertainty and creating a great sense of sustained perceptions of confidence in government agencies. The idea of a risk inoculation message is that having been exposed to the dangers before or at least being made aware of the hazards will protect people from overreacting when the next event occurs. The data from Study 2 show that an inoculation from a prior near-miss event that would prevent an increase in risk perception from a subsequent event does not just happen with information about the event. Our participants saw the second event as just as risky as the first even when their perception of the risk of the first had declined in between. We suspect there may have to be active intervention by governments or other parties to frame the message from the prior attempt so that it offers an inoculation rather than a reference point. We return to this in the general discussion. Downloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124.17] Study 3 was designed as a follow-up to Study 2 to further test Hypothesis 5 that reference points are important in the evaluation of our near-miss scenario events. If provided additional reference points, would participants see the weak near-miss scenario in time period 1 as different from the strong near-miss scenario in the same time period? In Study 3, we created a 2 × 2 design where half the participants saw a set of three attempted terrorist attack scenarios all at once and were then asked questions about the three attempts, and half the participants saw the same attempted attack scenarios but individually with the questions asked in between the described scenarios. Additionally, half the participants read the scenarios previously described in Study 2 in the order weak, medium, strong (i.e., increasing level of severity), and half read the scenarios in the order strong, medium, weak (i.e., decreasing level of severity). Participants were asked the same questions as in Study 2 and the same scales were used to measure the perception of how close the event was to being a successful terrorist attack and the perception of the risk of flying following the attack. Participants in Study 3 were a Qualtrics recruited panel (n = 182).
We look at those participants who saw the weak near-miss event first (i.e., terrorist is arrested before he launches a shoulder-fired missile at an airplane), the medium near-miss event second (i.e., the terrorist is arrested after he launches a shoulder-fired missile at an airplane and misses by more than 100 yards), and the strong near-miss event third (i.e., the terrorist is arrested after he launches a shoulder-fired missile at an airplane that damages the airplane and injures some passengers). Using a repeated measures ANOVA with perception of the events in times 1, 2, and 3 as the within subjects variable and condition as the between subjects variable, there is a main effect for perception of how close the different events were to being successful terrorist attacks, F 2 178 = 57 7, p < 0 001; a main effect for condition, F 1 89 = 26 1, p < 0 001, and a significant interaction, F 2 178 = 4 7, p = 0 01. Judging something as close to being a terrorist attack depends on past events that provide reference points for the evaluation. As shown in Figure 6 , being able to view all the scenarios and have the additional reference How We next examine those participants who saw the strong near-miss event first, the medium near-miss event second, and the weak near-miss event third. Using a repeated measures ANOVA with perception of the events in times 1, 2, and 3 as the within subjects variable and condition as the between subjects variable, there is a main effect for perception of how close the different events were to being successful terrorist attacks, F 2 178 = 49 0, p < 0 001; no main effect for condition F 1 89 < 1 0, but a significant interaction, F 2 178 = 7 2, p = 0 001. No main effect for condition means that both conditions evaluated the events in the same range of values, but the significant interaction shows that the perceptions of the three events were influenced by the condition. In particular, as can be seen in Figure 7 , when you see all three events at once, you can rationally allocate perceptions of the How Figure 8 shows the perception of risk of flying following each attack for the two scenario sequences by the over time/all at once manipulation.
Using a repeated measures ANOVA with perception of risk in times 1, 2, and 3 as the within subjects variable and condition as the between subjects variable, there is a main effect for perception of risk of flying following the event F 2 356 = 21 93, p < 0 001. There is no main effect for condition F 3 178 = 2 11, p = 0 10, but a significant interaction, F 6 256 = 10 09, p < 0 001. The main effect for perception of risk shows that across all four conditions, the risk is increasing, (M Risk-Time1 = 6 09, s.d. = 2 9, M Risk-Time2 = 6 7, s.d. = 2 8, M Risk-Time3 = 7 0, s.d. = 3 0), but the increase is greatest for the events shown in the sequence perceived to be getting worse rather than getting better.
Discussion. Figure 7 appears just as we hypothesized. When events are getting worse over time, participants view them as such because of the prior events serving as a reference point; the contrast is more severe for those judging the events all at once. Figure 8 shows a somewhat surprising result for those participants when things are getting better. Those who view the events all at once demonstrate the effect of the reference points. The "all at once" condition looks as we expect. However, for those who judge the events one at a time, their risk of event does not decline even though events they are judging have less severe outcomes. Instead there appears to be a cumulative effect. When the first event was fairly close to being a successful attack, participants perceived a certain level of risk, and then subsequent attacks (even though less close to being successful) seemed to reactivate their feelings of risk. Any initial vigilance, worry, or concern did not decline (or if it did decline, it returned with this subsequent event). Understanding how people respond to subsequent events is important in developing inoculation messages around terrorism near misses. That is, without careful crafting of risk communication messages regarding terrorist events that help the public resolve uncertainty and ambiguity, it is hard to tell whether a near-miss event will be seen as inoculation toward future events and help people get over things or whether they will just stay anchored and vigilant toward the event.
Having the opportunity to view and assess a sequence of events provides the participant with more reference points to evaluate different near misses, i.e., how close each event was to being a successful terrorist attack. The evaluations of the near-miss events were different with less reference points supporting Hypotheses 5 and 6. Additionally, an interesting observation that is important to DHS (and others responsible for terrorist risk communications), is the perception that events are getting worse significantly impacts perceptions of risk in comparison to the perception that events are getting better, when in reality the trend across several terrorist attempts may not represent anything more than luck. Patterns of getting better versus worse is very diagnostic of whether a problem or system is under control. Notice that when things appear to get better, perceptions of risk for the strong near miss are less than perceptions of risk for the weak near miss when things are getting worse.
General Discussion and Implications of Research
By combining one field study with two experimental lab studies, we were able to demonstrate decay in the perception of the risk of same-category events over time following the event. We were also able to demonstrate that the perception that a near-miss event is close to being a successful terrorist attack also declines Downloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124 .17] on 03 August 2015, at 13:46 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
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